There is a large body of IS research on individuals' IT security behavior. In the paper, we attempted to understand how individuals cope with IT security threats when such behavior is volitional. In this appendix, we briefly review the past studies in this domain. The current literature on individuals' volitional security behaviors has focused primarily on the cognitive reasoning process that motivates individuals to take protective actions against IT security threats. As shown in Table A1 , this literature has extensively studied individuals' security behavior in a variety of threat contexts including malware, spyware, hacking, email spam, phishing, identity theft, and device theft. Major theories applied include the protection motivation theory (PMT), the technology threat avoidance theory (TTAT), the health belief model (HBM) , and the theory of planned behavior (TPB). Based on the major theory applied, we grouped the studies in Table A1 . Regardless of the theory applied, these studies share a clear commonality -the focal dependent variable is either the security behavior or intention to perform such behavior. From the coping perspective, the action or intention to take protective measures to counter threats is essentially a PFC approach. Therefore, it is conspicuous that the existing research has predominantly investigated PFC. As to EFC, none of the studies that applied PMT, HBM and TPB has mentioned this concept. We have only found one article (Liang and Xue 2009) that discussed EFC in depth and developed formal propositions to explain EFC's relationship with other coping constructs. However, it is a pure theory building paper that offers no empirical evidence to back up the propositions. Several empirical studies based on TTAT (Arachchilage and Love 2014; Herath et al. 2014; Lai et al. 2012; Liang and Xue 2010) allude to EFC, but it is limited to a brief mention in the literature review. Neither is EFC theoretically elaborated, nor empirically tested in these studies. To date, in the IT security literature, we still know little about EFC. Questions such as "what EFC strategies are relevant in the IT security context," "why do people perform EFC when facing IT security threats," and "what are the consequences of EFC" have never been answered.
security policies. D'Arcy et al. explain that, in this context, stress is aroused by the overload, complexity, and uncertainty of security policy compliance. This is in sharp contrast with the volitional context in which users' stress is aroused by IT security threats. In addition, D'Arcy et al. did not study EFC directly; instead, they used moral disengagement as a surrogate of EFC. While moral disengagement makes sense when mandatory compliance is the target behavior, it is not as relevant when volitional security behavior is of interest, because individuals are unlikely to think their lack of security behavior to be immoral. Therefore, D'Arcy et al.'s study cannot be readily extended to the context of volitional security behavior. The role of EFC in the volitional context remains unknown. 
PFC

Planful problem solving
Deliberate problem-focused efforts to alter the situation coupled with an analytical approach to solving the problem WCQ Yes Users undertake specific actions to solve IT security problems. Some of the actions require appropriate planning and scheduling such as update of security software, hard disc scan, system backup, and security patching. In the research, the concept of PFC behavior overlaps with planful problem solving.
Confrontive coping
Aggressive efforts to alter the situation.
WCQ No
It is an "aggressive form of problem-focused coping that is largely interpersonal" (Folkman et al 1986a, p. 995 ). An example item is "I tried to get the person responsible to change his or her mind." It is not relevant when dealing with IT security threats because IT security threat is intangible.
Active coping Taking active steps to try to remove or circumvent the stressor or to ameliorate its effects.
COPE Yes
Users often actively take protective measures to reduce IT security threats. We included it as PFC behavior.
Planning
Thinking about how to cope with a stressor.
COPE Yes
It indicates users' intention to cope with threats. Consistent with PFC intention, which is considered in our robustness test.
Suppression of competing activities
Putting other projects aside, trying to avoid becoming distracted by other events, even letting other things slide, if necessary, in order to deal with the stressor.
COPE No
This form of coping is most appropriate when the activity to deal with the stressor is complicated and time consuming. For example, a Ph.D. candidate preparing for her thesis defense would suppress all other competing activities and focus only on her presentation. In the IT security context, security action is not highly complicated and doesn't need a lot of time to complete. Hence, it is farfetched to claim that one has to suppress other activities to engage in security action.
Restraint coping
Waiting until an appropriate opportunity to act presents itself, holding oneself back, and not acting prematurely.
COPE No
Makes little sense in the IT security context. When facing IT security threats, it is necessary to act immediately rather than wait.
Seeking social support for instrumental reasons
Seeking advice, assistance, or information.
COPE No
It is an auxiliary PFC behavior because it does not resolve security threats directly. It reduces the threat by influencing PFC behavior.
Note: WCQ = Ways of Coping Questionnaire (Folkman et al. 1986a) ; COPE = COPE inventory (Carver et al. 1989) . The inclusion/exclusion justifications are based on our deductive reasoning and interviews with 40 IT users.
Appendix C Definitions of EFC Concepts
Concept Definition/Description Source
Emotion-focused coping (EFC)
A type of coping in which individuals try to pacify or control the emotions aroused by the stressful situation or to dismiss the emotional discomforts. It includes inward and outward EFC. Wishful thinking refers to a person's escaping from the stressful situation by fantasizing that some intervening act or forth will turn things around in a desirable direction.
Folkman et al. 1986a
Outward EFC It refers to individuals' direct modulation of emotional responses or outcome of the emotion-generating process. Two specific outward EFC are selected in our research context: emotional support seeking and venting.
Gross and Thompson 2007
Emotional support seeking
Emotional support seeking means that a person reaches out to his or her social network to obtain moral support, sympathy, or understanding, in the presence of a stressor. et al. 1989; Folkman and Lazarus 1985 Venting Venting is the engagement in actions that ventilate whatever the distress that a person is experiencing so that emotional stability is achieved.
Beaudry and Pinsonneault 2010; Carver et al. 1989 Appendix D
Measurements
For each question, please indicate the extent to which you agree with the statement: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = neutral, 5 = slightly agree, 6 = agree, 7 = strongly agree.
Perceived Threat
Please describe how you thought about the IT security threat after you noticed it? 1. The malicious nature of the problem threatened me 2. 
Appendix E Q-Sort Procedures and Results
We validated the items with the Q-sort method, largely following the practices by Moore and Benbasat (1991) . We performed four rounds of sorting. In each round, we recruited five judges: two business faculty members, two doctoral students, and an information security professional who worked in the local area. When selecting the judges, we paid particular attention to their gender, nationality, and educational and professional background, so that a variety of perspectives could be offered.
We printed each of the candidate items on one 3 × 5 inch index card. In addition, we created 10 test cards for a test run with the judges. These cards contained 10 statements about automobiles. Some of them were ambiguously worded so that they might appear equally good for two or more categories to the judges. Before the sorting started, a set of standard instructions were read to the judges and we answered their questions about the sorting process. Then the judges sorted the 10 test cards by following the instructions. Afterward, we discussed with the judges the sorting results and resolved problems caused by ambiguous statements. After the judges familiarized themselves with the sorting method through this test run, we asked them to sort the emotion-focused coping items.
In Round 1, we did not provide the labels or definitions of the constructs to the judges. Each judge was asked to group the items into any number of categories and to label and define each category with their own language. As a result, two judges came up with seven categories and the other three came up with eight. A judge might not come up with an equivalent for every construct in our study. Similarly, some of the categories they identified did not have equivalents in our set of constructs. A judge might also determine that a particular item did not belong to any constructs. The inter-judge raw agreement scores averaged 0.588 and the Kappa scores averaged 0.532 (Table E1 ). The overall placement ratio was 66.72% (Table E2) . We examined the off-diagonal entries and found cross-loading between Denial and Psychological Distancing. Based on this observation as well as comments from the judges, we revised the wording in two items for Denial and two items for Wishful Thinking. We also added a new item into Wishful Thinking.
In Round 2, the revised items were sorted by another group of five judges. This time, we provided the judges with the labels and definitions for the constructs. Other than this, the entire process, including the test run, was identical to that of Round 1. As shown in Table E1 , the average inter-judge raw agreement increased to 0.836 and the inter-judge Kappa was 0.813. All Kappa coefficients were above the recommend threshold of 0.65 (Moore and Benbasat 1991) . The overall placement ratio improved to 91.00% (Table E2) .
In Round 3, we asked another five judges to participate. To test whether the improvement in inter-judge agreement and placement ratios in Round 2 were due to the fact that Round 2 judges had the construct labels and definitions, we used the exact same items from Round 2. However, this time the judges were told to decide by themselves how many categories should be created, how they were to be labeled, and what their definitions would be. Four judges identified eight constructs and the remaining one found seven. All the identified constructs matched well with the constructs in this study. Despite not having construct labels and definitions, the placement ratio continued to rise to 91.83% (Table E2 ). The average inter-judge raw agreement and Kappa also showed improvement to 0.882 and 0.865, respectively (Table E1 ). This assured us that the items had desirable construct validity and that the improvement from the first to the second round was not due to the judges having construct labels and definitions. In addition, based on comments from the Round 3 judges, we modified the wording of one item for Psychological Distancing. We also made slight changes to two items for Wishful Thinking. Each of the five constructs had four items. Overall, we had a set of 20 items.
In Round 4, the 20 items were sorted by another five judges. Similar to Round 2, the judges had the construct labels and definitions when they started. The sorting results showed further improvement. The average inter-judge raw agreement, average inter-judge Kappa, and the placement ratio increased to 0.921, 0.933, and 95.83%, respectively. Note: DNY = denial; DIS = psychological distancing; WT = wishful thinking; ESS = emotional support seeking; V = venting; THR = perceived threat; PA = perceived avoidability; INT = PFC intention; ACT = PFC behavior.
Appendix G Experiment Scenarios
Scenario 1 (High threat, high avoidability): After you downloaded a free movie from a website that you have never visited before, you suspected that malware could be downloaded onto your computer along with the movie. The malware could steal your personal information and make you a victim of identity theft and suffer from serious losses. This is a serious threat. You know that you have firewall and anti-virus and anti-spyware software running on your computer. You trust these protective tools and believe that they can effectively protect your computer from security breaches. You are confident that you can easily run a scan to find and remove the malware.
Scenario 2 (High threat, low avoidability):
After you downloaded a free movie from a website that you have never visited before, you suspected that malware could be downloaded onto your computer along with the movie. The malware could steal your personal information and make you a victim of identity theft and suffer from serious losses. This is a serious threat. You know that you have firewall and anti-virus and anti-spyware software running on your computer. But you are not sure these tools can protect your computer from the malware, because hackers keep finding new ways to outsmart the security tools. You feel that there is not much you can do about the malware.
Scenario 3 (Low threat and high avoidability):
After you downloaded a free movie from a website that you have never visited before, you suspected that adware could be downloaded onto your computer along with the movie. The adware creates pop-up ads whenever you open a new page in the browser. It can be annoying, but nothing threatening. You know that you have firewall and anti-virus and anti-spyware software running on your computer. You trust these protective tools and believe that they can effectively protect your computer from security breaches. You are confident that you can easily run a scan to find and remove the adware.
Scenario 4 (Low threat and low avoidability):
After you downloaded a free movie from a website that you have never visited before, you suspected that adware could be downloaded onto your computer along with the movie. The adware creates pop-up ads whenever you open a new page in the browser. It can be annoying, but nothing threatening. You know that you have firewall and anti-virus and anti-spyware software running on your computer to protect your computer from security breaches. But you are not sure these tools can protect your computer from the adware, because hackers keep finding new ways to outsmart the security tools. You feel that there is not much you can do about the adware.
Appendix H Measurement Validation for Study Two
Before validating the measurements, we assessed two potential biases associated with survey data: nonresponse bias and common method bias (CMB). Following Armstrong and Overton (1977) , we compared the demographic variables between the first 100 and last 100 respondents. T-tests show that the two groups do not differ in age (p = .06), computer experience (p = .86), number of security problems experienced (p = .59) and Internet hours per day (p = .85). Chi-square tests show that the two groups do not differ in gender (p = .49) and education (p = .41). These results suggest that nonresponse bias is not likely to exist.
In addition to procedural remedies to reduce CMB, we conducted three statistical tests to evaluate CMB. First, we carried out the Harmon's one factor test by following Podsakoff et al. (2003) . The items of the 10 first-order theoretical constructs were entered into a principal component analysis. Nine factors were identified and the first factor of the unrotated solution explains only 23.63% of the total variance, showing no indication of the existence of CMB. Second, we employed the correlational marker variable technique to assess CMB. Following Lindell and Whitney (2001) , the second smallest positive correlation amongst measurement items (r = .002) was selected as a conservative estimate of CMB. All of the between-item correlations were adjusted by partialling out the CMB estimate. Results revealed that the correlations only changed slightly in magnitude and remained unchanged in significance, suggesting that CMB is unlikely a concern. Third, following Podsakoff et al., we took the single latent method factor approach to testing CMB. A confirmatory factor analysis model including the 10 first-order constructs was created in AMOS. A latent method factor was added which took all of the construct items as its indicators.
Thus, each item was determined by both its theoretical construct and the latent method factor. The results show that the method factor only explains on average 0.56% variance in the items whereas the theoretical constructs explain on average 64.57% (see Table H1 ). Variances explain by common method only accounts for 1.03% of theoretically explained variances, indicating that CMB has no significant influence on our data. We then validated the measurement model with confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using AMOS 22. For both inward EFC and outward EFC, we respectively estimated three models: (1) the first-order model, (2) the second-order reflective model, and (3) the second-order formative model. In covariance-based SEM, it is necessary for a formative construct to have two emitting paths to achieve model identification (Diamantopoulos 2011; Jarvis et al. 2003) . The emitting paths point to two reflective indicators of the formative construct or two other endogenous constructs (the so-called MIMIC model). Because we did not have any reflective indicators for inward EFC and outward EFC, we included PFC intention and PFC behavior in the CFA model. Note: The cutoffs are based on Hu and Bentler (1999) and Gefen et al. (2011). Gefen et al. noted that the the χ²/df ratio can only be used as a simplifying heuristic and should not be relied on to affirm acceptable model fit. GFI and AGFI are biased by sample size and degrees of freedom and there is consensus against using these indexes to assess model fit (Sharma et al. 2005) . Therefore, we focus on using CFI, TLI, and RMSEA.
As Table H2 shows, for inward EFC, the second-order formative model fits better than the first-order model and the second-order reflective model, and for outward EFC, the second-order formative and second-order reflective models have identical fit indices and both are better than the first-order model. However, the differences are marginal, suggesting that all three models could be valid. We selected the second-order formative model over the first-order model because (1) it is theoretically parsimonious (Cenfetelli and Bassellier 2009; Gerbing and Anderson 1984; Law et al. 1999) , and (2) it avoids the muliticollinearity issue if the first-order constructs are used as independent variables (Koufterosa et al. 2009 ). We preferred the second-order formative model to the second-order reflective model because the subconstructs conceptually differ from each other, are not exchangeable, and do not necessarily covary (Jarvis et al. 2003; Petter et al. 2007 ). Therefore, the formative model is more theoretically justifiable than the reflective model.
Following Petter et al. (2007) , construct validity and reliability of the second-order formative measures were assessed by examining path weights and the VIF (variance inflation factor) statistics. As Figure H1 shows, each first-order subconstruct has a significant path pointing to inward or outward EFC, suggesting satisfactory construct validity. The VIF values of the five first-order subconstruct are under the recommended threshold, 3.3 (see Table H2 ), indicating acceptable reliability (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006) .
Finally, following Gefen et al. (2000) , validity of all of the first-order construct measures was tested using two procedures. First, the square root of each construct's average variance extracted (AVE) is much greater than the construct's correlations with all other constructs, suggesting sufficient discriminant validity (Table H3) . Second, factor loadings and cross loadings (Table H4) were generated by conducting a principal component analysis. All factor loadings on the substantive constructs are over 0.70, suggesting sufficient convergent validity. In addition, each item's factor loading is much higher than its cross-loadings on other constructs, confirming the sufficiency of discriminant validity (Hair et al. 1998) . We assessed the internal consistency of each construct by examining Cronbach's alpha and AVE. As Table 3 shows, all alpha coefficients exceed Nunnally's (1978) recommended .70, indicating acceptable internal consistency, and all AVEs are above the .50 level (Fornell and Larcker 1981) . **p < .01 *p < .05 Note: DNY = denial; DIS = psychological distancing; WT = wishful thinking; ESS = emotional support seeking; V = venting; THR = perceived threat; PA = perceived avoidability; INT = PFC intention; BEH = PFC behavior.
